Development · 2026-07-14

Open-access Fernverkehr fleets: Italo, FlixTrain and the financeability of merchant rolling stock

Two fleet commitments have moved German open-access long-distance rail from a niche into an asset class: Italo's planned market entry from April 2028 with 30 Siemens Velaro high-speed trains (an announced investment of €3.6 billion, via a newly founded German entity, Atrium SE), and FlixTrain's order of up to 65 Talgo 230 trainsets, all earmarked for Germany from 2028. Unlike every SPNV fleet discussed elsewhere on this site, these vehicles are financed on merchant risk — no Verkehrsvertrag, no PSO revenue, no Kapitaldienstgarantie. That makes the regulatory framework for track access the central credit question, and it is exactly there that the Bundesnetzagentur intervened on 30 June 2026 with a proposed competitor clause for congested corridors. This note reads the development through a financing lens.

Two fleets, two asset profiles

The two commitments are structurally different assets. Italo's 30 Velaro units are dedicated high-speed EMUs, to be maintained by Siemens under a maintenance contract reported to run for over 30 years; the plan is 56 daily services, with hourly Munich–Cologne–Dortmund and two-hourly Munich–Berlin–Hamburg connections. FlixTrain's Talgo 230 sets are locomotive-hauled push-pull rakes (Siemens Vectron traction, 230 km/h). For a financier the distinction matters at the residual-value line: a 300-km/h-class EMU homologated for the German network has a thin secondary market outside DB Fernverkehr and a handful of European high-speed operators, while a loco-plus-rake configuration decomposes into two separately re-marketable assets, one of which (the Vectron) is among the most liquid rail assets in Europe. The residual-value note applies with full force here — but for merchant fleets there is no authority-side Wiedereinsatzgarantie to catch the tail.

No PSO anchor: what actually secures the debt

SPNV rolling stock is financed against a contracted revenue stream from an Aufgabenträger, frequently wrapped by a Kapitaldienstgarantie. Open-access Fernverkehr has no equivalent anchor: the business case is farebox only, in competition with a state-owned incumbent that controls both the dominant network and — through DB InfraGO — the infrastructure bottleneck. The security package therefore has to be built from what the regulatory framework can be made to yield: durable track access (below), the manufacturer maintenance contract as a value-preservation covenant, vehicle authorisations, and the sponsor's balance sheet. It is no coincidence that both projects lean on strong sponsors and manufacturer involvement, and that Italo's entry is structured through a dedicated German vehicle-operating entity — the corporate architecture is doing part of the work that a PSO contract does in SPNV.

Track access as the credit question — the BNetzA's competitor clause

A merchant fleet with a 25-to-30-year life financed against annual timetable allocations is, in credit terms, an asset-liability mismatch. Italo raised precisely this planning-security point with the Bundesnetzagentur, asking in substance for long-term framework access of the kind DB InfraGO has so far granted only in annual cycles. The BNetzA's answer of 30 June 2026 is a proposed Wettbewerberklausel: on congested corridors no single operator is to be allocated more than roughly 60–75 per cent of long-distance capacity, protected regional and freight shares stay untouched, and the rule attaches to timetabled services with at least four daily departures at two-hour intervals; DB InfraGO is also to offer competitors station space for sales and lounges on non-discriminatory terms. BNetzA president Klaus Müller framed the rationale in financing language: competitors of DB Fernverkehr “must invest a great deal of money in new vehicles” and need corresponding certainty. A two-week consultation and parallel review by the Bundeskartellamt and Monopolkommission follow. If the clause survives in something like this form, it is the closest thing open-access financiers have yet had to a regulatory revenue underpinning — not a guarantee, but a capacity floor that makes the volume side of the business plan bankable. The mechanism will eventually have to be read together with the multi-annual capacity-planning regime of the incoming EU Capacity Regulation, which points in the same direction.

The incumbent's read — and the market's

DB InfraGO has responded cautiously, defending the existing allocation framework. Among the challengers there is no united front either: Flix CEO André Schwämmlein has publicly dismissed Italo's entry as “no competition for Flix” but a problem for DB, positioning FlixTrain as the second full network alongside DB Fernverkehr, while passenger and competitor associations press for a stable multi-operator framework so that the offer does not fragment from the customer's perspective. For financiers the disagreement is itself a datum: three players (plus possible further entrants under the competitor clause) will be bidding for overlapping corridor capacity, and corridor-level revenue assumptions should be stress-tested against a crowded 2028–2030 timetable.

What to put on the checklist

For anyone structuring or reviewing finance for open-access fleets aimed at Germany, the current state of play suggests the following. First, treat the outcome of the BNetzA proceeding — including the Kartellamt and Monopolkommission review — as a condition-precedent-grade item, not background noise: the capacity floor is the de facto revenue covenant. Second, diligence the maintenance architecture as a value covenant: a 30-year manufacturer maintenance contract preserves asset value but also concentrates counterparty and pricing risk in one supplier, and its assignability on enforcement needs to be express. Third, model residual value without an authority backstop and distinguish sharply between EMU and loco-hauled configurations. Fourth, check the authorisation and deployment timeline against the April 2028 entry dates — slippage in vehicle authorisation compresses the ramp-up on which the merchant case depends. Fifth, watch whether framework agreements (Rahmenverträge) with terms beyond the annual timetable become available — a 10-to-15-year framework agreement would change the financing structure more than any single clause in the vehicle documents.

Where this sits

See the financing structures page for the SPNV instruments this segment lacks, the Operators overview for the competitive landscape, and the Capacity Regulation note for the EU-level capacity-planning regime that will frame long-term access.

Sources: Bundesnetzagentur press release of 30 June 2026 (proposed competitor clause); Flix press releases of December 2025 and 2026 on the Talgo 230 order and its German deployment; press reporting on Italo's entry plans (30 Siemens Velaro, €3.6bn, April 2028, Atrium SE) and on DB InfraGO's response; trade-press coverage including Der Rote Renner, 13–14 July 2026. Figures are as announced by the parties and have not been independently verified. Last reviewed: 14 July 2026. These notes are not legal advice. See the Disclaimer.